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Abstract 
Managers often have to deal with the financial and ethical risks that companies face. Evidence 
from risk management research suggests a negative relationship between people’s age and risk 
taking tendencies. Within such a framework, the present contribution examines how different 
perceived occupational rewards may mediate or interact within the relationship between age 
and risk taking of managers at the company-level. Our results show that perceived rewards in 
terms of job security partially mediate the relationship between age and ethical risk taking, 
while perceived rewards related to job promotion moderate the effect of age on financial risk 
taking. We further discuss the role of different organizational strategies to preserve an 
organization’s health. 
 
Keywords: occupational rewards; job promotion; job security; risk taking; managerial decision 
making. 
  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Running head: RISK TAKING AMONG MANAGERS 3 
 
Contemporary work environment and organizational assets are characterized by an ever-
increasing need to face organizational management and human resource challenges. In order 
for risks and opportunities to be adequately evaluated and successfully managed, research 
needs to address the mediating, and/or moderating factors behind risk attitudes in the 
workplace. In the light of the organizational, economical and societal changes that occurred 
after the financial crisis in 2008, the need for a deeper understanding of the psychological 
aspects inherent in risk management within organizations represents a contemporary core-issue 
(Sartori, Ceschi, & Costantini, 2015) in order to design effective reward policies.  
In addition to wages and salaries, today’s managerial work offers primarily 
performance-dependent organizational rewards (OR; Kinnunen, Feldt, & Mäkikangas, 2008) 
such as esteem rewards, job promotion and job security. Esteem rewards represent the extent 
to which one perceives to be respected, supported and accepted by supervisors and colleagues, 
while job promotion rewards refer to the perception of pay fairness as well as career 
opportunities. In contrast, job security rewards include perceptions related to status consistency 
and to stability (Siegrist, 1996). Such operationalization of rewards within the work 
environment makes it possible to focus on how they relate to managerial decisions involving 
risk taking. 
Research has demonstrated the importance of considering risk tendencies related to age 
differences (Rolison, Hanoch, Wood & Liu, 2013) as well as contextual factors (e.g., Dickert, 
Västfjäll, Mauro, & Slovic, 2015; MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1990), which should predict 
behavior across different domains and situations (Schoemaker, 1990). In order to measure the 
likelihood of engaging in risky activities, the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale 
has been developed (Blais & Weber, 2006). This self-report questionnaire addresses the 
domain-specific nature of risk across six broad domains (Weller, Ceschi, & Randolph, 2015), 
of which the financial and the ethical domains are the most relevant with respect to the 
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managerial role. Whereas financial risk taking constitutes a general part of managerial decision 
making, a more contemporary and often politicized aspect of managerial responsibilities also 
includes ethical risk taking.  
Occupational rewards as mediators and moderators 
To date, the relationship between risk taking and rewards among managers has been primarily 
investigated by the financial and accounting literature (Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2013). In 
contrast, studies conducted within a psychological framework have focused more on the 
investigation of how risk taking develops and changes across the lifetime. With these regards, 
one of the key findings often reported is that older adults tend to be more risk avoidant (Rolison 
et al., 2013). However, literature on how executives’ risk behaviors change across the lifespan 
reports evidence that risk aversion may follow a curvilinear trend (Pepper & Gore, 2014), with 
executives aged 55-59 being more risk averse than both younger and older ones. Even if mixed, 
these findings support the notion that age influences managerial risk behaviors. 
Concerning the relationship between risk taking and rewards among executives, one of 
the major contribution is the behavioral agency model of executive risk taking (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Meija, 1998), which combines context-dependent elements and individual differences 
to explain the relationship between executives’ risk behaviors and rewards. In particular, this 
model posits that agents are primarily loss averse and that their propensity to take risks depends 
on perceptions of their individual compensation endowment. Building on this model, 
individual perceptions of occupational rewards may play a major role in fostering different 
behavioral outcomes among managers. However, research on the effectiveness of rewards is at 
best mixed (Eisenberger & Shanock, 2003). This is especially the case concerning buffering 
effects (Byron, & Khazanchi, 2012; de Jonge, Gevers, & Dollard, 2014), which may depend 
on the nature of rewards and the context in which the rewards are being offered (Byron & 
Khazanchi, 2012).  
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For example, an imbalance between (high) effort and (low) reward can cause poor 
outcomes (Siegrist, 1996). Studies conducted within this framework mainly focused on the job 
demands-resources relationship and reported mixed findings of OR moderating effects (de 
Jonge, Gevers, & Dollard, 2014; van Vegchel, de Jonge, & Landsbergis, 2005), which may be 
due to a mismatch between specific demands and resources of the context considered (de Jonge, 
& Dormann, 2006), as well as to the way in which rewards are operationalized (van Vegchel, 
de Jonge, Bakker, & Schaufeli, 2002). Moreover, the relevance of individual OR perceptions 
in fostering different outcomes among managers has produced evidence that managers’ 
perception of low gains (i.e. low OR) matters for adverse outcomes (i.e. turnover intentions; 
Kinnunen, Feldt, and Mäkikangas, 2008). 
Overall, research in economics and psychology supports the notion that agents’ 
compensation influences managerial work behaviors, including risky ones, which depend both 
on context and on individual differences (Pepper & Gore, 2015). Accordingly, age differences 
may relate to different risk behaviors among managers, which in turn may be influenced by 
OR. However, we did not pose any specific hypothesis concerning the different strength of 
each moderator considered because of the lack of comparative research on which to ground 
them. 
The effects of age on risk taking may depend on rewards, specifically we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a: Perceived rewards in terms of esteem moderate the relationship between 
age and risk taking (both ethical and financial).  
Hypothesis 1b: Perceived rewards in terms job promotion moderate the relationship 
between age and risk taking (both ethical and financial). 
Hypothesis 1c: Perceived rewards in terms of job security moderate the relationship 
between age and risk taking (both ethical and financial). 
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However, senior managers are more likely to be promoted and usually benefit from higher job 
security (Daveri & Maliranta, 2007; Mills, 1985), having at the same time lower chances to 
find a new job. Accordingly, risk taking may be perceived as potentially threatening because 
weighing potential losses (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) would be implied. 
That is, job promotion and job security can serve as mechanisms through which age relates to 
risk taking.  
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship of age with ethical and financial risk taking is mediated 
by perceived rewards in terms of job promotion. 
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship of age with ethical and financial risk taking is mediated 
by perceived rewards in terms of job security. 
Method 
Participants and procedure 
Participation in the study was accomplished via a web-based survey sent to 113 managers from 
different companies operating throughout Italy in a large variety of different segments. 
Contacted participants were selected from a national panel of executives, from which we 
identified those with responsibilities for defining and executing their company’s strategy, i.e. 
those stating in their profile to be operating board attendees. Of the total number of surveys 
mailed, 71 questionnaires were considered valid and usable for the study, for a response rate 
of 63%. Table 1 reports the educational level of participants, their company’s size, tenure 
expressed in years and the number of employees directly supervised. 
Since previous findings reported that managers have different risk attitudes when 
making decisions involving personal versus company money (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 
1986, 1990) and given that we aim to explore how OR influence risk behaviors at the company 
level, we adapted our risk-taking measures to reflect this level of analysis (see Appendix A).  
Measures 
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Occupational rewards. The perception of work environment rewards was measured through 
the administration of the Italian version (Magnavita, Garbarino, & Siegrist, 2012) of the reward 
scale from the short ERI-Questionnaire (Siegrist, Wege, Pühlhofer, & Wahrendorf, 2009). This 
questionnaire is composed of three subscales: esteem (measured by two items), job security 
(measured by two items), and job promotion (measured by three items). Participants indicated 
the degree to which they agreed with each item on a 4-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree 
to 4 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha for the esteem scale was .60, .69 for the job security 
scale, and .61 for the job promotion scale.  
Ethical and financial risk taking. Domain-specific risk taking was measured with a subset of 
adapted items from the DOSPERT scale (Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), namely those pertaining 
to the ethical and the financial domain referred to the working context. Items used in this study 
are provided in Appendix A. The final version of the scale used in our study consisted of 11 
items, of which five referred to the ethical domain and six to the financial one. Cronbach’s 
alpha for these scales in this study was .89 for financial risk taking, and .92 for the ethical 
domain. Participants gave an indication of the likelihood that they would engage in the 
described activities or behaviors if they were to find themselves in a given situation. Each 
participant responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“Extremely unlikely”) to 5 
(“Extremely likely”).  
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 details the correlations among the study variables. Financial (FRT) and Ethical Risk 
Taking (ERT) were significantly positively correlated (r = .67, p < .01). Both risk taking 
measures were also significantly negatively correlated with age (r = −.31, p < .01; r = −.37, p 
< .01 for FRT and ERT, respectively) and with job security (−.29, p < .05; r = −.35, p < .01, 
for FRT and ERT, respectively). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Running head: RISK TAKING AMONG MANAGERS 8 
 
--------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
Hypotheses testing 
We tested the effects of age, job security, job promotion, and esteem as predictors for both 
financial and ethical risk taking (results are presented in Table 2). Only age and job security 
significantly predicted both types of risk taking, such that risk taking increased with lower age 
and lower job security.  
--------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
To test for the possible moderating effects of job security, job promotion, and esteem we mean-
centered these variables and used bootstrapping following the PROCESS procedure 
recommended by Hayes (2013). Results indicate that only job promotion significantly 
moderates the effects of age on financial risk taking, B = .314, t(67) = 3.36, p = .001.  
--------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
A simple slope analysis revealed that for lower levels of perceived job promotion, age has a 
stronger negative influence on FRT (-1 SD below the mean), B = -.581, t(67) = -4.82, p < .001, 
whereas this effect disappears for higher levels of job promotion (+1 SD above the mean), B = 
.046, t(67) = .30, p = .763. None of the other moderating effects was significant. Thus, younger 
managers report higher FRT when they do not perceive job promotion rewards. 
To test whether the effects of age on risk taking are mediated by job security and job 
promotion, we used bootstrapping following the PROCESS procedure recommended by Hayes 
(2013). Results of these analyses revealed that age was significantly related to job security (B 
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= .35, p < .01), which in turn was significantly related to ERT (B = -.25, p < .05). That is, there 
was a significant indirect effect of age on ERT through job security (B = -.09; 95%CI [-.211, -
.013]). The unstandardized regression coefficient for the direct effect of age on ERT was B = 
-.28, p < .05, with a 95%CI [-.211, -.013]. The indirect effect through job promotion was not 
significant. For ERT, job security could account for roughly a quarter of the total effect, PM
1
 = 
.24. 
For what concerns FRT, no statistically significant mediation effects of job security 
occurred, since the job security-FRT relationship was not significant (B = -.21, p = .063; 95%CI 
[-.430, .012]). The unstandardized coefficient for the direct effect of age on FRT was B = -.24, 
p < .05, with a 95%CI [-.183, -.004]. The indirect effect of age on FRT through job security 
was significant (B = -.074; 95%CI [-.183, -.004]).  
Figure 2 illustrates the partial mediation effect of job security for ERT (all relationships are 
significant), and for FRT, reporting the unstandardized regression coefficients. 
--------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------- 
 
Discussion 
Results here reported show that the only significant interaction was found between age and job 
promotion on FRT but not on ERT. This indicates that rewards related to job promotions 
influence the effect of managers’ age on risk taking for financial risks, but not ethical risks. 
Whereas age has virtually no influence on FRT when perceived job promotions are high, 
younger managers take on more financial risks than older managers when perceived job 
promotions are low.  
                                                          
1 Percent of the total effect (c) accounted for by the indirect effect (ab). 
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Moreover, our results show that perceived rewards related to job security partially 
mediate the relationship between age and ERT. This suggests that the effect of age on 
managers’ ethical risk taking can be explained by differences in perceived job security. As job 
security increases, managers take fewer risks, but only for what concerns ERT.  
These findings confirm previous ones from the risk taking literature, validating the assumption 
that older adults are more commonly risk avoidant (Rolison, Hanoch, & Wood, 2012; Rolison 
et al., 2013; Turner & McClure, 2003), including older managers (Vroom & Pahl, 1971). 
Moreover, our findings provide support for the notion that agents’ perceptions of rewards 
influence their risk behaviors (Pepper & Gore, 2015).  
A closer look at the investigated rewards reveals a strong relationship between age and 
all the reward sub-dimensions considered except esteem. Our results also revealed an 
interaction between age and job promotion on FRT but not on ERT. Job promotion rewards 
include aspects related to both pay fairness and career opportunities. Thus, our results add 
evidence to previous literature on pay fairness (Shaw & Gupta, 2001) by showing that more 
senior managers take less company-level financial risks than junior managers when perceived 
pay fairness and career opportunities are low. Interestingly, this pattern is not shown for ERT, 
suggesting that the moderating effects of different rewards may be domain specific. In line with 
this reasoning, esteem rewards, which may be viewed as a more individual-based reward than 
other organizational-based perception of rewards like job promotion and job security, showed 
no statistically significant relationship with ERT or FRT.  
Results also showed a significant partial mediating effect of job security between a 
manager’s seniority and his/her company-level ERT. Job security, which represents the extent 
to which one perceives status consistency within one’s work environment, is positively linked 
to age. Our findings further show that perceptions of job security decrease company-level ERT. 
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It seems that the perception of being fairly rewarded in terms of job security produces a positive 
effect (i.e., a reduction) on the tendency to assume ethical risks. 
Limitations 
Overall, our study contributes to previous research aimed at understanding the impact of 
rewards on managerial behavior (Indjejikian, 1999; Rajgopal & Shevlin, 2002) and the ways 
in which specific work domains can affect the type of reward to be offered (Marsden & 
Belfield, 2010). It should be noted, however, that the conclusions we draw from the present 
research are based on a homogenous sample of Italian managers, which might affect the 
transcultural validity of our results. Moreover, future research should try to increase sample 
size in order to test the robustness of the regression results presented here (Harris, 2001; Kelley 
& Maxwell, 2003). Additionally, from a methodological point of view, the measures we used 
were all self-reported, which may lead to common method biases (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 
& Podsakoff, 2003), not controlled in our study. Finally, we point out that mediation analyses 
in cross-sectional data should be interpreted with caution and that causal inferences cannot be 
drawn without further investigation (Selig & Preacher, 2009; Maxwell & Cole, 2007). Our 
finding that age decreases managers’ risk taking through its effects on perceived job security 
seems plausible given that older managers often have more experience and security in their 
jobs, but additional research should be done to verify the relationship between job security and 
risk taking.  
Implications for managerial behavior 
Besides the theoretical contribution to the research on rewards in managerial decision making, 
our results also suggest specific practical ways in which OR can be used to improve managerial 
behavior. The effects of (younger) age on managerial risk taking can be a liability for 
companies that wish to avoid financial losses and ethical scandals. A reward structure that 
provides high job promotion opportunities can help avoid that junior managers take 
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unnecessary financial risks. Also, higher job security can reduce risk taking specifically for 
junior managers. While our results also suggest that esteem does not directly relate to financial 
or ethical risk taking, and has no relation to managerial seniority, it does relate to job 
promotions. Therefore, it is possible that other measures that increase managers’ esteem (e.g., 
company recognition) can also have positive effects on job promotions and thereby on FRT. In 
sum, interventions to foster effective corporate governance should include changing 
occupational reward structures from performance-based financial bonuses to better job 
promotion chances. While managerial decision making will probably always be accompanied 
by certain financial and ethical risks, work environments that ensure job security and 
opportunities of career advancement provide the conditions to deal better with risk taking, 
especially for what concerns younger managers.  
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Figure 1.  
Graphical Representation of the Moderation Effect of Job Promotion on Age and Financial Risk Taking (FRT). 
 
 
 
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficients. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  
Graphical Representations of the Partial Mediation Effect of Job Security on the Relationship Between Age and Ethical (ERT) and 
Financial Risk Taking (FRT). 
 
 
 
Note. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. 
 
   
 
 
Figure
  
Table 1.  
Means, Standard Deviations (SD), Internal Consistencies (on the Diagonal) and Correlations among Socio-Demographics and Study Variables. 
  
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Age 38.70 10.93 − 
         
2. Education 4.80 2.06 −.08 − 
        
3. Company size 1.58 .50 −.09 −.21 − 
       
4. Length of service 12.94 11.51       .63**     −.32** −.05 − 
      
5. Employees managed 3.14 1.48   .15   .12 −.07   .14 − 
     
6. Job security 2.73 .66       .35** −.04 −.11   .21 −.10   (.69)  
   
7. Job promotion 2.57 .55   .04 −.03 −.10   .05 −.03   .21   (.61) 
   
8. Esteem 3.01 .55 −.04   .14 −.14 −.12   .21   .12     .30*   (.60) 
  
9. Financial risk taking 2.35 1.07     −.31** −.04   .11 −.11 −.08   −.29* −.10   .05 (.89) 
 
10. Ethical risk taking 1.98 1.01     −.37** −.21   .14 −.13 −.19     −.35** −.02 −.04     .67** (.92) 
Note. N = 71. Education: 1 = Elementary school; 2 = Lower general secondary education; 3 = Higher general secondary education; 4 = Preparatory vocational education; 5 = Higher professional 
education; 6 = Bachelors’ degree; 7 = Masters’ degree; 8 = Ph.D. Company size: 1 = Micro (up to 10 employees, income less or equal to 2 million euro per year); 2 = Small (up to 50 employees, 
income less or equal to 10 million euro per year); 3 = Medium (up to 250 employees, income less or equal to 50 million euro per year); 4 = Big (more than 250 employees, income more to 50 
million euro per year). Length of service: tenure expressed in years. Employees managed: 1 = up to 2 supervised co-workers; 2 = 3 to 5 supervised co-workers; 3 = 6 to 10 supervised co-
workers; 4 = 11 to 25 supervised co-workers; 5 = more than 25 supervised co-workers. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
 
 
 
Table
 Table 2.  
Regression Analyses for Mediation and Moderation Effects of Age and Job Security, Job 
Promotion, and Esteem Predicting Financial and Ethical Risk Taking. 
Model Predictors 
FRT  ERT 
β R2  β R2 
Model A Age −.31**   −.37**  
   .10**  
 
.13*** 
Model B Job Security −.29**   −.35**  
   .09**   .12*** 
Model C Job Promotion −.01**   −.02**  
   .01**   .01*** 
Model D Esteem −.05**   −.04**  
   .01**   .01*** 
Model AB Age −.23**   −.28**  
 Job Security −.21**   −.25**  
   .13**   .19*** 
Model AC Age −.31**   −.37**  
 Job Promotion −.09**   −.03**  
   .10**   .14*** 
Model AD Age −.31**   −.37**  
 Esteem −.04**   −.06**  
   .10**   .14*** 
Model A × B Age −.23**   −.27**  
 Job Security −.21**   −.26**  
 Age × Job Security −.01**   −.04**  
   .13**   .19*** 
Model A × C Age −.27**   −.35**  
 Job Promotion −.04**   −.08**  
 Age × Job Promotion −.31**   −.18**  
   .19**   .16*** 
Model A × D Age −.31**   −.37**  
 Esteem −.04**   −.03**  
 Age × Esteem −.04**   −.13**  
   .10**   .15*** 
Note. N = 71. R2 = Explanation rate; FRT = Financial risk taking; ERT = Ethical risk taking. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
 
Appendix A.  
 
For each of the following items, please indicate the likelihood that you would engage in each 
activity/behavior if you were to find yourself in the described situations.  
 
1. Investing 10% of your company’s annual profit in a new business venture. (F) 
2. Investing 10% of your company’s annual profit in a moderate growth fund. (F) 
3. Reporting a little less in your company’s financial statements. (E) 
4. Falsifying someone else’s signature due to unexpected obligations related to the 
organization’s functioning. (E) 
5. Copying and passing off somebody else’s work as your own due to company’s needs. (E) 
6. Speculating by investing 5% of the annual company’s profit in very speculative stock. (F) 
7. Illegally downloading software useful for your company. (E) 
8. Speculating by investing 5% of the annual company’s profit in dependable stock. (F) 
9. Connecting to an online service useful for your company illegally, without paying the 
monthly fee. (E) 
10. Speculating by investing 10% of the company’s annual profit in Treasury Bills. (F) 
11. Speculating a part of the company’s annual income. (F) 
 
Note. Items referred to the ethical domain are marked with (E), items referred to the financial domain are 
marked with (F).  
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1. p. 7 "To test whether the effects of age on risk taking are mediated by job security and job 
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